CIVIL RIGHTS-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-STATE LIMITATION
PERIOD FOR PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS APPLIES TO ALL SECTION 1983 CLAIMS-Wilon v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985).

"Few areas of the law stand in greater need of firmly defined, easily
applied rules than does the subject of periods of limitations."*
When enacting new legislation, Congress often fails to provide
for a specific statute of limitations.' Consequently, the task of determining the appropriate limitation period is relegated to the courts. 2
One issue that has caused uncertainty and confusion among the
Federal circuit courts is the applicable statute of limitations for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which was originally part of
the Reconstruction Civil Rights Act.3 Recently, however, the United
States Supreme Court resolved this issue in Wilson v. Garcia.4 In Wilson, the Court held that because section "1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions," courts should apply the
appropriate state statute of limitations for actions of this nature.5
The Wilson litigation arose on January 28, 1982, when Gary
Garcia brought an action in the United States District Court for the
District of New Mexico against Richard Wilson, a New Mexico State
Police officer, and Martin Vigil, Wilson's superior officer. 6 Garcia
claimed that on April 27, 1979, he had been "unlawfully arrested,"
"brutally and viciously" beaten, and sprayed in the face with tear gas
by Wilson.7 Garcia further alleged that Vigil had failed to supervise
* Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 1942 (1985) (quoting Chardon v. Fumero
Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 667 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
I See id. (citing Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483 (1980)).
2 See id.

3 See Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)). Section 1983 provides that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982); see also infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (discussing history of § 1983).
4 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985).
5 Id. at 1949.
6 Id. at 1940.
7 Id. Garcia claimed that Wilson committed these acts while under the color of
state law. Id.
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Wilson properly.8 These events, Garcia argued, had deprived him of
the civil rights guaranteed by the fourth, fifth, and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution.9
The defendants moved to dismiss Garcia's action, which was
filed two years and nine months after the abuses allegedly occurred,
on the ground that it was barred by the two-year statute of limitations provided in the New Mexico Tort Claims Act.1 0 In support of
their motion, the defendants relied on a New Mexico Supreme
Court case,"' De Vargas v. State ex rel. New Mexico Department of Corrections. 2 De Vargas, which was factually similar to Garcia's action,
"held that the Tort Claims Act provides 'the most closely analogous
state cause of action' to [a section] 1983" claim commenced in the
New Mexico courts.' 3 Nevertheless, the district court rejected the
defendants' argument.' 4 In an unpublished opinion, the court
noted that the state decision failed to bind the Federal courts because the statute of limitations under section 1983 was a matter of
Federal law.' 5 After examining other New Mexico statutes of limitations,' 6 the district court held that the most appropriate New Mex8 Id. Garcia alleged that Vigil had notice of Wilson's "violent propensities" and
had failed to reprimand Wilson for these actions. Id.
9 Id. Garcia sought monetary relief for both his constitutional claims and an
additional claim for the personal injuries he suffered as a result of Wilson's actions.
Id.
10 Id. at 1939, 1940. The New Mexico Tort Claims Act provides as follows:
Actions against a governmental entity or a public employee for torts
shall be forever barred, unless such action is commenced within two
years after the date of occurrence resulting in loss, injury or death, except that a minor under the full age of seven years shall have until his
ninth birthday in which to file. This subsection applies to all persons
regardless of minority or other legal disability.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-15A (1978).
I' Vilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1940.
12 97 N.M. 563, 642 P.2d 166 (1982).
13 Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1940 (quoting De Vargas, 97 N.M. at 564, 642 P.2d at
167).
14 See id. at 1941.
15

Id.

16 In addition to examining the statute of limitations contained in the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, the district court reviewed a three-year statute of limitations
for "injury to the person or reputation of any person," which more specifically provides as follows:
Actions must be brought against sureties on official bonds and on
bonds of guardians, conservators, personal representatives and persons
acting in a fiduciary capacity, within two years after the liability of the
principal or the person from whom they are sureties is finally established or determined by a judgment or decree of the court, and for an
injury to the person or reputation of any person, within three years.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-8 (1978). The four-year residual statute of limitations that
was selected by the court provides that all actions "founded upon accounts and
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ico statute of limitations was one that embraced all actions not
otherwise provided for or specified.' 7 This statute established a
four-year limitation period.' 8 Accordingly, the court denied the defendants' motion for dismissal.' 9
Immediately thereafter, the defendants filed an interlocutory
appeal, which the Tenth Circuit accepted. 0 A unanimous en banc
panel affirmed the ruling of the district court; however, it did so on
alternate grounds. 2 ' The circuit court agreed with the district court
on the inapplicability of De Vargas.2 2 Nevertheless, it determined
that the district court had chosen an incorrect limitation period.2 3
Instead, the circuit court held that the appropriate limitation period
for section 1983 actions was the New Mexico statute of limitations
for injuries to personal rights.2 4 The court reasoned that there
should be one limitation period for all section 1983 matters and that
actions for injuries to personal rights are common to every section
1983 claim.2 5 Because the New Mexico statute of limitations for
personal injuries was three years, the court affirmed the lower
court's decision.2 6 The defendants then appealed to the United
States Supreme Court.2 7 The Court granted certiorari2 8 and, in a
seven-to-one decision, affirmed the Tenth Circuit's holding.2 9
Section 1983's predecessor, contained in the Civil Rights Act of
187 1,30 was enacted as a result of the racial discrimination that was
unwritten contracts[,] those brought for injuries to property or for the conversion
of personal property or for relief upon the ground of fraud, and all other actions
not herein otherwise provided for and specified [must be brought] within four
years." Id. § 37-1-4.
17 Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1941.
18 See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-4; see also supra note 16 (text of this provision).
19 Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1941.
20 Id. at 1941 & n.8. The district court certified the interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982). Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1941.
21 See Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 651 (10th Cir. 1984), aff d, 105 S. Ct. 1938
(1985).
22 Id. at 651 n.5.
23 Id. at 651.
24 Id.; see also supra note 16 (discussing personal injuries statute of limitations).
25 See Garcia v. Wilson,731 F.2d 640, 650-51 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct.
1938 (1985).
26 Id.
27 See Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1942.
28 Wilson v. Garcia, 469 U.S. 815 (1984).
29) Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1949.
3o Ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)). The
Act was also popularly known as the Ku Klux Act. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 171 (1961).
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widespread during the Civil War and the Reconstruction era. 3 l This
legislation was implemented with such haste that Congress neglected to provide a specific statute of limitations.3 2 Thus, the
courts were left to determine the appropriate statute of limitations
for section 1983 actions.33
The judicial development of the applicable statute of limitations
for section 1983 actions can be traced to the early-nineteenth-century case of McCluny v. Silliman.34 In McCluny, the practice of borrowing state statutes of limitations originated.3 5 The case involved
an action against a Federal official for refusing to accept the plaintiff's application to purchase tracts of land. 36 The official argued
that the action should be dismissed because it was time-barred by a
state statute of limitations." In a landmark decision, the Supreme
Court held that under the Rules of Decision Act,3 8 Federal courts
must adopt state law where Congress has failed to legislate.3 9 Accordingly, the Court applied the state statute of limitations and dismissed the action.40
Sixty-five years later, in 1895, the Supreme Court extended the
application of the Rules of Decision Act in Campbell v. Haverhill.4
The Court addressed the question of whether state statutes of limi31 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-83 (1961) (general discussion of the
Act's purpose).
32 See Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1942; see also Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17
Stat. 13, 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
33 See Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1942.
34 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830).
35 See id. Commentators disagree, however, on whether McCluny is the seminal
case in this area. Compare Note, A Limitation on Actions for Deprivationof FederalRights,
68 COLUM. L. REV. 763, 767-68 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Note, Limitation on Actions] and Note, A Callfor Uniformity: Statutes of Limitations in Federal Civil Rights Actions, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 61, 64 n.25 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Call for
Uniformity] (both asserting that the reason state law was applied was because McCluny involved a state action in Federal court based on diversity jurisdiction) with
Hill, State Procedural Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 66, 79
(1955) and Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 1976
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 97, 102 n.37 (both arguing that the McCluny Court applied a state
statute of limitations to a Federally created cause of action).
36 McCluny, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 275-76.
37 See id. at 276.
38 Ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1982)). The Rules of Decision Act provided "[t]hat the laws of the several states,
except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common
law, in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply." Id.
39 See McCluny, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 277-78.
40 Id. at 278.
41 155 U.S. 610 (1895).
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tations apply to patent infringement actions.4 2 The defendant argued that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the Massachusetts
statute of limitations,' 3 and the Court agreed. 4
Initially, the Campbell Court noted that when patent statutes
were originally enacted, they included an express limitation period
for infringement actions.4 5 When these statutes were later revised,
however, Congress neglected to provide any limiting provisions.4 6
Despite the fact that the plaintiff's action was brought during a time
when no express limitation period existed, the Supreme Court refused to infer that there was an unlimited time period to bring suit
in patent actions. 47 To remedy this situation, the Court applied the
Rules of Decision Act, which required the Court to look to the forum state for an applicable limiting statute. 4 1 While the Court ultimately invoked the statute of limitations for tort actions, it neither
explained its holding nor addressed alternative limitations. 49
It was not until 1914, in the case of O'Sullivan v. Felix,50 that the
Court applied the provisions of the Rules of Decision Act to civil
rights actions. In that case, the defendants allegedly assaulted the
plaintiff to prevent him from voting."i The plaintiff sued for damages, but failed to initiate the action until over two years after the
incident. 5 2 Accordingly, the defendants moved to bar the action
based on the state one-year statute of limitations for the recovery of
damages. 5 3 The plaintiff, however, countered that the Federal fiveyear limitation period for the enforcement of penalties was control42 Id. at 613. Some commentators believe that Campbell is the seminal case in
this area. See Note, Limitation on Actions, supra note 35, at 768; Note, Callfor Uniformity, supra note 35, at 64 & n.25.
43 Campbell, 155 U.S. at 611. The trial court agreed and granted a directed verdict in favor of the defendant. Id. The plaintiff then appealed upon a writ of error
to the Supreme Court. Id.
44

Id. at 621.

Id. at 613-14.
Id. at 614.
47 Id. at 616-17.
48 Id. at 614-16.
49 See id. at 614, 621. Two theories have been suggested for the Court's selection of the statute of limitations for tort actions. See Comment, supra note 35, at
104-05. Either the Court determined that tort actions were most closely analogous
to patent infringement actions or it used the tort limiting period because the time
period for the lapsed Federal limitation was identical. Id.
50 233 U.S. 318 (1914).
51 Id. at 320.
45

46

52

Id. at 321.

Id. The state one-year statute of limitations was to be invoked for "offenses
or quasi offenses." Id. at 322.
53
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ling.54 The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument, reasoning that
actions brought for the deprivation of civil rights seek the remedy of
damages rather than punishment.5 5 Thus, relying on Campbell, the
Supreme Court concluded that the state statute of limitations was
the proper statute to apply. 5 6
The advent of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 eliminated the need for courts
to apply the "borrowing" doctrine in choosing the applicable limitation period for Reconstruction Civil Rights litigation.
Section
1988 provides a three-step analysis that Federal courts must make
when determining the applicable statute of limitations.5" First, the
court should search Federal law to determine if a suitable provision
exists.59 Second, if no Federal law applies, the court must select an
appropriate state provision.6" Finally, if a state limiting period is
chosen, the court must assure its consistency with Federal laws and
policy. 6 ' Hence, it has been argued, the application of the section
1988 test requires a court to choose the "most analogous" state limiting period for section 1983 actions.62
This selection process, which on its face appears to be relatively
simple, is responsible for the difficulty that plagued the circuit
54 See id. at 321-22. The Federal five-year statute was to be applied to actions for
the "prosecution for any penalty or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, accruing
under the laws of the United States." Id. at 322.
55 Id. at 324-25.
56 See id. at 321.
57 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (originally enacted as Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31,
§ 3, 14 Stat. 27, 27). The Act, as amended, provides as follows:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions of this Title and of Title "Civil Rights,"
and of Title "Crimes," for the protection of all persons in the United
States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised
and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as
such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where
they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions
necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law,
the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or
criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and
govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it
is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party
found guilty.
Id.
58
59

See id.
See id.

60 See id.
61 See id.
62 See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488 (1980).
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courts when analyzing section 1983 cases.6" Although the pre-Wilson Supreme Court articulated the general rule-courts must apply
an analogous state statute of limitations to civil rights actions where
Congress neglects to provide a specific limiting period-it failed to
delineate specific guidelines for the lower courts to follow.' Consequently, a split occurred within the circuits on the issue of whether
courts should employ the specific facts of a case to determine the
proper state statute of limitations (the "factual-analysis approach")
or disregard the facts involved and focus on the cause of action (the
"uniform approach").6 5
Under the factual-analysis approach, a court examines the
plaintiff's complaint to determine which state actions are the most
analogous to the facts set out in the plaintiff's section 1983 claim.6 6
Next, the court determines which state statute of limitations applies
to the analogous state claim.6 7 This limiting period is then applied
to the section 1983 action.6 8 The Federal courts that followed the
factual approach were the First, Third, Fifth, Eleventh, District of
Columbia, and, until its decision in Wilson, the Tenth Circuits.6 9
The Third Circuit's decision in Polite v. Diehl 7" illustrates the
factual-analysis methodology. In Polite, the plaintiff brought an action against police officers of the McKeesport Police Department
under section 1983.71 The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle
accident and was subsequently arrested by the police for drunken
driving.7 2 The plaintiff complained that he was beaten, sprayed in
the face with mace, and forced to plead guilty to crimes he did not
commit. 7 3 Approximately twenty-three months after his arrest, the
63 See, e.g., Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 643 (10th Cir. 1984), aft'd, 105 S. Ct.
1938 (1985); Polite v. Diehl, 507 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1974).
64 See Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 643 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 1938
(1985).
65 See infra notes 70-81 & 87-111 and accompanying text.
66 See Biehler, Limiting the Right to Sue: The Civil Rights Dilemma, 33 DRAKE L. REV.
1, 5 (1983).
67 Id.

68

Id.

See, e.g., McGhee v. Ogburn, 707 F.2d 1312 (1 lth Cir. 1983); Gashgai v. Leibowitz, 703 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1983); Clulow v. Oklahoma, 700 F.2d 1291 (10th Cir.
1983); McClam v. Barry, 697 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Shaw v. McCorkle, 537
F.2d 1289 (5th Cir. 1976); Polite v. Diehl, 507 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1974).
70 507 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1974).
69

71

Id. at 121.

Id. Before arresting the plaintiff, the policemen transported the plaintiff and
his passengers to a local hospital. Id.
73 Id. The plaintiff asserted that he was "forced to plead guilty to charges of
disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and failure to have a driver's license and ownership card as required by Pennsylvania law." Id.
72
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plaintiff filed a section 1983 action against the defendants. 4 The
defendants then moved for summary judgment on the ground that
the statute of limitations had run, claiming that the one-year statute
of limitations for false arrest was controlling.7 5 The plaintiff countered that the court should use the two-year statute of limitations for
personal injuries. 76
The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, and the plaintiff appealed to the circuit court.7 7 The
Third Circuit determined that the district court should have applied
different statutes of limitations to each claim. 7' Accordingly, the
court applied a one-year limitation period to the false arrest claim 79

and other limitation periods to the plaintiff's remaining claims.8 0
The court reasoned that this approach was the most appropriate because the application of a single limiting period to multiple claims
would have the "anomalous result" of dismissing certain actions
that should be allowed and allowing other actions that should be
dismissed. 8
In contrast to the factual-analysis methodology, the Second,
Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have
applied the uniform approach in determining the appropriate limitation period under section 1983.82 This method requires a court to
examine the nature of a section 1983 cause of action to determine
which state cause of action best exemplifies the purpose of section
74
75

Id. at 121 & n.1.

Id. at 121-22. The Pennsylvania statute the defendants relied on provided as
follows: "Every suit to recover damages for malicious prosecution or for false
arrest . . . must be brought within one year from the date of the accruing of such

right of action, and not thereafter ..

"PA.

STAT. ANN. tit.

12, § 51 (Purdon 1953).

Polite, 507 F.2d at 122. The Pennsylvania statute the plaintiff argued should
control provided that "[e]very suit hereafter brought to recover damages for injury
wrongfully done to the person, in cases where the injury does not result in death,
must be brought within two years from the time when the injury was done and not
76

afterwards."

PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

77
78

Polite, 507 F.2d at 122.

79

Id.; see supra note 75.

12, § 34 (Purdon 1953).

Id.

80 Polite, 507 F.2d at 123. The court determined that the two-year limiting pe-

riod should apply to the plaintiff's assault and battery claim, that a six-year limiting
period should apply to the plaintiff's action for recovery of his automobile, and that
a two-year limiting period should apply to his allegation that he was coerced into
pleading guilty. Id.
81
82

Id.

See, e.g., Garmon v. Foust, 668 F.2d 400 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998
(1982); Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1000 (1982); Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331 (7th Cii. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S.
907 (1978); Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1972); Smith v. Cremins, 308
F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1962).
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1983. 8 s The court then applies the statute of limitations for the
state action to the plaintiff's 1983 claim. 84 Once a circuit determines which state statute of limitations is appropriate for section
1983 actions, each court within the circuit must use the same type of
state action for all section 1983 claims. 85 The following were the
most commonly applied state statutes of limitations: those for liability created by statutes, those for torts or personal injuries, those created for state actions comparable to section 1983 actions, and catchall or general limitations.8 6
In 1962, the Ninth Circuit first recognized the movement toward a uniform limitation period in Smith v. Cremins.8 7 Smith involved a section 1983 action against two Los Angeles police
officers.88 The plaintiff complained that he was deprived of his constitutional rights when the police officers confiscated the religious
leaflets he was publicly distributing.8 9 The district court dismissed
the action for the plaintiff's failure to comply with California's oneyear statute of limitations "for assault, battery, false imprisonment,
and certain actions for damages for seizure of property." 90 On appeal to the circuit court, the plaintiff asserted that the proper limiting period was the California three-year statute of limitations for
"liability created by statute."'" In reversing the district court's
holding,9 2 the court of appeals espoused the rationale that subsequently became the cornerstone of later courts' approval of the uniSee Biehler, supra note 66, at 5, 7.
See, e.g., supra note 82.
See, e.g., McCausland v. Mason County Bd. of Educ., 649 F.2d 278, 279 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981).
86 Biehler, supra note 66, at 3; see, e.g., Garmon v. Foust, 668 F.2d 400 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998 (1982); Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187 (9th Cir.
1962) (all applying state statute of limitations for liability created by statute);
Kosikowski v. Bourne, 659 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying state statute of limitations for cases comparable to § 1983 actions); Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331
(7th Cir. 1977) (applying state catch-all statute of limitations); Almond v. Kent, 459
F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1972) (applying state statute of limitations for torts); Rinehart v.
Locke, 454 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1971) (applying state catch-all statute of limitations).
87 308 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1962).
88 Id. at 188.
89 Id. The plaintiff was distributing the leaflets at the Los Angeles International
Airport "to protest the arrival . . . of Russian Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan."
Id. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that he was deprived of his constitutional "right
to free speech and free exercise of religion, the right not to be deprived of property
without due process of law, the right to be secure against unreasonable searches
and seizures, and the privilege of discussing national issues." Id.
90 Id. at 189.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 190.
83
84
85
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form approach.9 3
First, the Smith court rejected the application of a limiting period based on a common law tort. 9 4 NotingJustice Harlan's concurrence in Monroe v. Pape,9 5 the court pointed out that the elements of
a section 1983 action are more expansive than those of a common
law tort. 96 Second, the court recognized the practical considerations involved in selecting the limiting period for liability created by
statute.97 The court reasoned that had it segregated each claim
made by the plaintiff, it would have had to apply two or more distinct statutes of limitations, which would have caused inconsistency
and confusion in its decision.9 8 Stressing the need for uniformity,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the appropriate time period was
one for liability created by statute. 99
In the years that followed, the acceptance of a uniform approach grew among the circuits.' 0 0 In 1981, the Second Circuit decided Pauk v. Board of Trustees 101 and further clarified the uniform
methodology. In that case, a professor at Queens College sued the
school's board of trustees for denying him an appointment and tenure.' 0 2 The professor was unsuccessful in an action brought in state
court and thus subsequently initiated a section 1983 action in a Federal district court.'0 3 The district court determined that the professor's action was time-barred, and the professor appealed to the
Second Circuit.' 4 The appellate court, however, affirmed the lower
05
court's decision. 1

93 See Biehler, supra note 66, at 33 ("The Ninth Circuit, by its decision of Smith v.
Cremins, was one of the forerunners of consistency and uniformity in its decision
making process for civil rights limitation application.").
94 Smith, 308 F.2d at 189.
95 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
96 Smith, 308 F.2d at 190. The court stated that " 'a deprivation of a constitutional right is significantly different from and more serious than a violation of a
state right and therefore deserves a different remedy even though the same act may
constitute both a state tort and the deprivation of a constitutional right.' " Id.
(quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 n.5 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.

See, e.g., cases cited supra note 82.
101 654 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982).
102 Id. at 858-59. The professor claimed that his employment was terminated
because of his involvement with a faculty union. Id. at 859.
103 Id. Before the professor initiated his action in a state court, he had pursued a
nonjudicial course by filing a grievance with an arbitrator "in accordance with the
collective bargaining agreement between the [board of trustees] and the faculty
union." Id. One month later, however, the professor withdrew his grievance. Id.
100

104

105

Id. at 858.
Id.
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The Pauk court began its analysis by noting that it had previously held that the applicable statute of limitations for section 1983
actions was the three-year period for "liability created or imposed
by statute."'' 1 6 The court recognized, however, that its previous
holdings had to be reconsidered in light of a then-recent Supreme
Court decision, which held that section 1983 is remedial in nature
and does not create substantive rights.'0 7 First, the court explained
that it disapproved of limitation periods that were less than three
years because they were inconsistent with the remedial purposes of
section 1983.08 The court further noted that there existed no perfect analogy to a state statute for section 1983 claims.' 0 9 Thus, in
the interest of attaining uniformity within a state, the court concluded that its application of the three-year period for statutory liability was correct.' 'o
The factual-analysis approach and the uniform methodology
represented the two opposing views held by the circuit courts concerning the limiting period to apply to section 1983 claims."' In
12
Wilson, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve this conflict.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens began the opinion of the
Court by noting that Congress had failed to provide a specific statute of limitations for section 1983 actions." 1 3 The Court explained
that the established practice under these circumstances was to borrow a state statute of limitations and to apply it to the Federal
law. 114
To determine the appropriate state limitation period, the majority stated that courts should follow the three-step process outlined in section 1988."' Justice Stevens opined that the issue in
106
107

See id. at 859.

Id. at 861; see Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618-20
(1979). The professor asserted that it was illogical to apply a statute of limitations
that was specifically enacted for "liability created or imposed by statute." Pauk, 654
F.2d at 861. Instead, the professor urged that the six-year limitation period for
either contract actions or residual claims should be applied. Id. While the board of
trustees agreed with the professor that the statute for "liability created or imposed
by statute" was incorrect, they advocated that the court apply either the one-yearand-ninety-day period for actions against a city or its employees or the four-month
period for actions against officers. See id.
108 See id.at 861-62.
109 See id.
110 See id. at 866.
III See supra notes 65-105 and accompanying text.
112 See Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1942.
''3 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.; see also supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text (discussing the three-step
process).
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Wilson primarily involved the second step, which requires the selection of state law if no Federal law exists. 1 6 He set forth three questions, however, that courts must address before1 7 adopting the "most
appropriate" or "most analogous" state law."
First, the majority stated that a court must consider whether
section 1983 claims are to be characterized by state or Federal
law. 8 Again, the Court borrowed the text of section 1988." I Justice Stevens observed that a proper reading of this statute requires a
court to exhaust all principles of Federal law before invoking state
law.' 2 ° The Court then pointed out that "[t]he characterization of
§ 1983 for statute of limitations purposes is derived from [both] the
elements of the cause of action, and Congress' purpose in providing
it."'' Therefore, because Federal law exists to address this issue,
requires a court to treat its
the majority concluded that section 1988
22
characterization as a Federal matter.'
Furthermore, Justice Stevens stated that the third step in section 1988 supports this conclusion. 123 The step requires the limiting period borrowed from a state to be consistent with Federal
law. 124 The Court reasoned that this "emphasizes 'the predominance of the federal interest' in the borrowing process, taken as a
whole."' 1 25 Hence, once a state statute is borrowed, it loses its state
126
identity and becomes a part of the larger Federal scheme.
In addition, the Court believed that Congress clearly did not
intend that state legislatures and courts should play a significant
role in the formation of a Federal cause of action. 12 7 The Court also
reviewed prior decisions and determined that the characterization of
Federal claims " 'is ultimately a question of federal law.' -128 Thus,
Justice Stevens agreed with the Wilson lower courts that the Federal
courts were not bound by De Vargas, a New Mexico Supreme Court
116 Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1943.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 See id.
120 Id.

121 Id.
122 Id. The Court held that the only questions that are characterized as state issues are the length, application, and tolling of the limitation period. Id.
123 Id.; see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
124 Wilson, 105 S.Ct. at 1943.
125 Id. (quoting Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 48 (1984)).
126 See id.

Id. at 1944.
Id. (quoting International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 706 (1966)).
127

128
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decision. 129
After concluding that the Federal law should apply to the characterization of section 1983 actions, the Court addressed the second
question-whether a factual-analysis approach or a uniform approach should be employed in determining the appropriate limitation period under section 1983.130 Initially, Justice Stevens noted
that because section 1983 remedies are unlike any remedies available under state law, any analogy between section 1983 and a state
cause of action is bound to be deficient. 13 1 On the other hand, the
majority observed that almost every section 1983 action can be analogized to numerous common law actions, each of which have different limiting periods. 3 ' Thus, the Court stated that the application
of a factual-analysis approach would allow an attorney to argue effectively that two or more limiting periods should apply to a specific
section 1983 action. 133 The Court stated that the Congress that enacted section 1983 could not have intended this use of the factualId.; see also supra notes 10-26 (discussing the lower courts' decisions in Wilson).
See Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1945-47. The second part of the Court's analysis
began with a discussion of the repugnant nature of timeless actions. See id. at 194445. The Court noted that without limiting periods, an equitable determination of a
case would be impossible. Id. at 1944. Hence, the Court declared that by borrowing state statutes of limitations, Federal courts not only achieve a policy of repose,
but benefit from the state's judgment on the proper length of time to bring suit in
specific actions. Id. at 1945.
131 Id. The Court noted that claims under § 1983 are unique to Federal law because they are brought to preserve protected constitutional rights against state incursions. Id. In addition, the Court recognized that although § 1983 remedies are
supplemental to state rights, they have no equivalent in state law. Id. Thus, the
Court concluded that any remedy that might appear to be similar to a § 1983 remedy is only coincidence. Id.
132 Id. For example, the Court explained that Garcia's
§ 1983 claim is arguably analogous to distinct state tort claims for false
arrest, assault and battery, or personal injuries. Moreover, the claim
could also be characterized as one arising under a statute, or as governed by the special New Mexico statute authorizing recovery against
the State for the torts of its agents.
Id.
133 Id. at 1946. For instance, the Court noted that claims
alleged under § 1983 would encompass numerous and diverse topics
and subtopics [such as] discrimination in public employment on the basis of race or the exercise of First Amendment rights, discharge or demotion
without
procedural
due process,
mistreatment
of
schoolchildren, deliberate indifference to the medical needs of prison
inmates, the seizure of chattels without advance notice or sufficient opportunity to be heard-to identify only a few.
Id. (footnotes omitted). If this approach were used, Justice Stevens stated, "different statutes of limitations would be applied to the various § 1983 claims arising in
the same State, and multiple periods of limitations would often apply to the same
case." Id. (footnotes omitted).
129
130
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analysis approach.' 3 4 The majority thus adopted the uniform approach because of the practical considerations of simplicity of application and certainty. 35 Although the Court recognized that it had
opposed national uniformity in civil rights litigation in prior decisions, it held that a uniform approach in each state is consistent with
section 1988.136

Finally, the Court addressed the question of which state cause
of action has the most appropriate limiting period for section 1983
claims.' 3 7 After reviewing the post-Civil War atrocities, which were
the catalyst for the enactment of section 1983's predecessor (the Reconstruction Civil Rights Act), the Court observed that these actions
clearly "sounded in tort."'' 3 8 While the Court noted that it had previously used tort analogies to establish the elements of a section 1983
claim, it recognized that a section 1983 remedy embraces a wider
range of possible tort analogies.1' After reviewing the potential
analogies, the Court ultimately determined that section 1983 actions
should be characterized as "injuries to personal rights."' 40 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the court of appeals had "correctly
applied the 3-year statute of limitations governing actions 'for an
injury to the person or reputation of any person.' ""
See id. at 1946-47. The Court acknowledged that the Congress that enacted
§ 1983 could not have foreseen the wide variety of actions that would be brought
under the statute. Id. at 1946. Moreover, the Court asserted that the simplistic
nature of § 1988 is consistent with the belief that Congress intended the selection
of a state statute of limitations to be an uncomplicated process. Id. at 1946-47.
134

135

See id.

Id. at 1947. The Court determined that "the need for national uniformity 'has
not been held to warrant the displacement of state statutes of limitations for civil
rights actions.' " Id. (quoting Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 489
(1980)).
137 See id. at 1947-48.
138 Id. The Court quoted the congressional debates on the Reconstruction Civil
Rights Act to emphasize the heinous events of the times:
"While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while whippings and
lynchings and banishing [sic] have been visited upon unoffending American citizens, the local administrations have been found inadequate or
unwilling to apply the proper corrective. Combinations, darker than the
night that hides them, conspiracies, wicked as the worst of felons could
devise, have gone unwhipped of justice. Immunity is given to crime,
and the records of public tribunals are searched in vain for any evidence
of effective redress."
Id. at 1947 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 374 (1871) (remarks of
Rep. Lowe)).
139 Id. at 1948. The Court suggested that the possible tort analogies spanned the
spectrum "from injuries to property to infringements of individual liberty." Id.
136

140

Id.

Id. at 1949 (citation omitted); see also supra notes 20-26 (discussion of Tenth
Circuit's decision). The Court opined that had the Congress in 1871 focused on
141
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In reaching this conclusion, the Court expressly rejected limitations based on catch-all statutes and limitations based on wrongful
acts of public officials.' 4 2 Recognizing the scarcity of statutory actions when section 1983 was enacted, the Court believed that a
catch-all approach was not intended by Congress.143 Justice Stevens
further reasoned that Congress could not have intended courts to
apply a state statute of limitations for offenses committed by public
officials to section 1983 actions because the ineffective remedies
under state law were the very reason for Congress's enactment of
section 1983.144 The majority therefore concluded that a uniform
approach, which characterizes all section 1983 claims as actions for
personal injuries, should be used.' 4 5
In a dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor declared that the majority had incorrectly abandoned the "venerable" rule of borrowing
14 6
state statutes of limitations from factually similar state actions.
She believed that by adopting the uniform approach, the majority
had ignored the policies of section 1988.14' The dissent agreed
with the majority, however, that section 1983 claims should be char1 48
acterized as Federal matters.
Justice O'Connor reviewed the historical development of section 1983 actions and determined that it was consistent with the factual-analysis approach. 4 9 She noted that while Congress could
have provided a limiting period for section 1983, it chose instead to
require Federal courts to adopt the state limiting period for similar
actions.1 50 Thus, the dissent asserted that the majority's decision
the issue in Wilson, "it would have characterized § 1983 as conferring a general
remedy for injuries to personal rights." Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1948.
142 See Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1948-49.
143 Id. at 1948. The Court pointed out that catch-all limitation periods were a
product of statutes that were enacted by the states long after the enactment of
§ 1983's predecessor. See id. The majority further noted that § 1983 is only a remedial statute and fails to create substantive rights. Id.
144 Id. at 1949.
145 Id. The Court noted that "personal injury" statutes have long been used to
characterize § 1983 claims and that it is unlikely that the application of their limiting period would hinder any Federal right. Id.
146 Id. (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 See id. at 1949-50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor traced the origins of borrowing state statutes of limitations back to McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S.
(3 Pet.) 270 (1830). Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1950 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also
supra notes 34-40 (discussing the McCluny case).
150 Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1950 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor further pointed out that "a number of bills proposed to recent Congresses to standardize § 1983 limitations periods have failed of enactment." Id. at 1951
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amounted to judicial legislation.1 5 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor
believed that previous Supreme Court decisions supported the fac52
tual-analysis approach. 1
Justice O'Connor then turned her attention to the policy considerations underlying the factual-analysis approach. 5 3 Justice
O'Connor pointed out the benefits of relying on the wisdom of state
legislatures when choosing an analogous state limitation period for
a Federal action.' 54 For example, the dissent explained that because
actions sounding in defamation are obviously different than those
brought under contract, it is logical to have limiting periods of varying length. 1 55 In addition, the dissent noted that evidence becomes
stale quicker in some situations than in others. 56 Therefore, Justice
O'Connor approved of the procedure of choosing state statutes of
limitations on a case-by-case basis.' 57
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent asserted that this should be interpreted to
mean that Congress does not agree with a uniform approach. Id. at 1951-52
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
151 See id.
152 Id. at 1950 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor asserted that the
"Court has consistently interpreted § 1988 as instructing that the rule applicable to
the analogous state claim shall furnish the rule of decision." Id. (citing Board of
Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584
(1978); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975)).
153 See id.
154 Id. QuotingJohnson v. Railway Express Agency, Justice O'Connor stated:
"Although any statute of limitations is necessarily arbitrary, the length
of the period allowed for instituting suit inevitably reflects a value judgment concerning the point at which the interests in favor of protecting
valid claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting prosecution
of stale ones ....
In borrowing a state period of limitation for application to a federal cause of action, a federal court is relying on the State's
wisdom in setting a limit ... on the prosecution of a closely analogous
claim."
Id. (quotingJohnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975)).
155 See id. Justice O'Connor remarked that a state legislature's selection of different limiting periods for different claims is based on "its evaluation of the characteristic of those claims relevant to the realistic life-expectancy of the evidence and the
adversary's reasonable expectations of repose." Id.
156

See id.

See id. at 1950-51 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent stated, "Despite
vocal criticism of the 'confusion' created by individualized statutes of limitation,
most Federal Courts of Appeal and state courts have continued the settled practice
of seeking appropriate factual analogies for each genus of § 1983 claim." Id. at
1950. In support of her statement, the dissent cited the following decisions:
Brown v. United States, 742 F.2d 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2153
(1985); Gashgai v. Leibowitz, 703 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1983); McClam v. Barry, 697
F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Blake v. Katter, 693 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1982); White v.
United Parcel Serv., 692 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1982); Kilgore v. City of Mansfield, 679
F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1982); Polite v. Diehl, 507 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1974). See also Note,
Choice of Law Under Section 1983, 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 494, 504 (1970) (the uniform
157
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Justice O'Connor reprobated the majority for accepting the
state's judgment on the appropriate length of time to bring suit in
specific state actions while refusing to acknowledge that an analogy
between section 1983 and any state cause of action was plausible.' 5 8
Furthermore, she stated that the majority had failed to make a "serious attempt" at explaining its rejection of the factual-analysis approach.' 59 Justice O'Connor recognized the appealing aspects of
the Court's "all-purpose analogy"; however, she believed that "so
sweeping an analogy is no analogy at all."' 6 ° In conclusion, Justice
O'Connor asserted that the majority's promise of uniformity among
the statutes was illusory.' 6 ' She explained that because section
1983 actions are usually joined with state actions based on the same
facts-which are not always "personal injuries"-inconsistencies
would exist between the statute of limitations for actions brought in
state courts and those brought in Federal courts. 1 62 Hence, Justice
O'Connor declared that the Court was creating "fresh problems of
asymmetry that are of far greater moment to the local
practitioner." 163
Despite the Wilson Court's "bright-line" determination of which
state statute of limitations is most applicable to section 1983 actions,
its decision is not without shortcomings. The most notable deficiency lies in the majority's failure to recognize exceptions to its
rule. Instead of writing an opinion setting forth persuasive arguments leading to sound conclusions, the majority wrote a defensive
decision that had as its main purpose the justification of its holding.
approach "disregard[s] the unanimous judgment of the states that periods of limitations should vary with the subject matter of the claim").
158 Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1951 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
159 Id. Justice O'Connor explained that the only fundamental difference that the
Court identified between state actions and § 1983 actions are the latter's " 'uniqueness,' its 'high purposes,' [and] its 'supplementary' nature." Id. These, she continued, "in no way explain the determination that a single inflexible analogy should
govern what the Court concedes is the 'wide diversity' of claims [that a] § 1983
remedy embraces." Id.
160 Id. Justice O'Connor conceded that "[t]he Court's all-purpose analogy is appealing; after all, every compensable injury, whether to constitutional or statutory
rights, through violence, deception or broken promises, to the person's pocketbook, person or dignity, might plausibly be described as a 'personal injury.' " Id.
161 Id. at 1952 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
162 Id. The dissent noted that under some circumstances, state actions, will become stale prior to § 1983 actions, and in other cases, the § 1983 action will become stale prior to the state action. Id. Furthermore, Justice O'Connor explained
that some states-such as Utah--do not have a statute of limitations for claims alleging "personal injuries." See id. at 1953 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Thus, she
asserted that "the rule the Court adopts fail[s] in application." Id.
163 Id.
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While the dissent offered a more cogent opinion, its determination
was far less appealing than the majority's. Thus, neither opinion
presents a consummate determination of the issues.
Although the majority's decision provides an attractive alternative to the problematic factual-analysis approach, it is a clear departure from prior law.' 6" In previous decisions, the Court explained
that the need for national uniformity in civil rights litigation should
not displace the application of state statutes of limitations.' 65 To
circumvent these holdings, the majority discussed its approach in
terms of state uniformity.' .6 6 The result, however, was a procedure
that established a uniform method of applying state statutes of limitations for "personal injury" actions to every section 1983 claim
brought in a Federal court.
Moreover, the majority's decision permits plaintiffs to forum
shop. Forum shopping occurs when a litigant attempts to have his
claim heard by a court in a jurisdiction where he would receive a
favorable decision.' 6 7 Logically, most plaintiffs will try to use procedural rules to move their case to a jurisdiction with a longer statute
of limitations. This not only wastes time, but creates difficulties
when witnesses are forced to travel to other jurisdictions. A better
solution would be for Congress to set forth uniform national guidelines for the various types of actions brought under section 1983.
Another drawback of the majority's decision is that it fails to
provide for any exceptions. Prior to Wilson, every circuit court had
applied one or more exceptions to its chosen approach. 6 These
exceptions were formulated in response to the realization that section 1983 actions involve a myriad of subjects, which are impossible
to categorize in a like manner.' 69 By imposing one statute of limitations for all section 1983 actions, the majority disregarded the perception that statutes of limitations should vary according to the
subject matter of a claim.
Conversely, the dissent's conclusion reaches a result that is incongruent with the purposes of civil rights litigation. The Recon164 See supra note 152.
165 See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Tomanio,
166 See Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1947.
167 BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 590 (5th ed.

446 U.S. 478, 489 (1980).
1979).

168 See, e.g., Kosikowski v. Bourne, 659 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1981) (Oregon statuto-

rily provided a limiting period for § 1983 actions).
169 See Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 647 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 1938
(1985). The Tenth Circuit noted that "[a]lthough the [Seventh Circuit] indicated
that one limitations period should uniformly be applied to all civil rights claims, the
court has found it impossible to do so given the differing statutes of limitations in
other states." Id.
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struction Civil Rights Acts were created to allow quick resolutions of
infractions of guaranteed constitutional rights. 7 ' The pre-Wilson
decisions, however, occasionally required costly and lengthy procedural hearings in order to resolve section 1983 actions. 17 ' Requiring civil rights litigants to incur these burdens in determining
whether their claims were barred might compel some, parties to
forego their actions. Accordingly, the dissenting opinion, which favored the factual-analysis approach, leaves a lot to be desired.
In addition, the Court's decision neglects to address the question of how its holding will affect the other sections of the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts. 172 Two schools of thought have
addressed this inquiry. 173 The first suggests that the holding of the
majority should be applied to the remaining sections. 1 74 This view
is based upon section 1988's application to all of the sections that
do not have specific statutes of limitations 1 75 and the broad sweep of
the individual Acts.' 76 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has applied a state statute of limitations for "personal injuries" to other
sections.' 7 7 Thus, practical
considerations and simplicity suggest
17 s
the use of this approach.

The opposing view maintains that the majority's decision
should not be used for the remaining sections of the Reconstruction
Civil Rights Acts. 1 79 Instead, proponents of this view argue, alternate analogies that have separate purposes and histories and are
170

See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-83 (1961) (discussing the Acts'

purposes).
171

See Wilson, 105 S.Ct. at 1945 & n.25.

See generally Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982)); Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982)); Act ofJuly 31, 1861, ch. 33, 12 Stat.
284 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1982)).
172

173 See infra notes 174-182.
174 See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens

Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 119 (3d Cir. 1985) (Wilson decision applies to § 1981 actions).
175 See supra notes 57-62 (discussing § 1988's method of determining the appropriate limiting period).
176 See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180-82 (1976) (state statute of
limitations for "personal injuries" applies to § 1981 actions).
177 See, e.g., id. at 181 (Court applied two-year state statute of limitations for personal injuries to § 1981 claim).
178 But see Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 131 (3d Cir. 1985)
(Garth,J., dissenting) ("This conclusion is inconsistent with history, precedent, and
logic, and in any event is not required by Wilson.").
179 See id. at 131-38 (Garth,J., dissenting); see also Comment, supra note 35, at 101
("There seems to be no reason for adopting different analogies for actions under
sections 1981 or 1982 than for actions under sections 1983 and 1985.").
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substantially different should be sought for the other sections.'
Furthermore, they argue that the various sections have been primarily used for divergent situations.'
Hence, this school asserts that it
is incorrect to apply the holding in Wilson to all of the sections of the
Acts.'

8 2

While both views present viable alternatives, additional
Supreme Court decisions will inevitably be required to reach a final
determination of the issue. Noting the apparent difficulties with the
Court's decision, a better approach to determining the proper limiting period for section 1983 actions would be a legislative enactment
by Congress. Although Justice O'Connor pointed out that Congress has attempted to legislate in this area without success,' 8 3 the
salient point that she neglects to discuss is the fact that each of the
recent bills that were proposed to Congress included various other
changes to section 1983."4 If a bill were proposed that provided
only limiting periods for the various sections without specific statutes of limitations, it would more likely be passed. Thus, the time,
money, and effort that is presently being channeled into appeals
from time-barred civil rights actions should be used to enlist the aid
of Congress to reach an answer. Only then will these questions be
put to rest.

Stephen W, Bialkowski
180 See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 132 (3d Cir. 1985) (Garth,J.,
dissenting).
181 See id. at 131 (Garth, J., dissenting).
182 Id.
183 Wilson, 105 S. Ct. at 1951 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
184 See, e.g., S. 436, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 1983, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979).

